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RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SECTION 10(b)
AND THE EXPRESS REMEDIES OF THE SECURITIES
ACTS: THE NEED FOR AN INTERNALLY CONSISTENT
APPROACH TO IMPLICATION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)' and
2
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5 prohibit the use of
manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security. Although section 10(b) does not provide expressly for a
private right of action, courts consistently have granted private plain3
tiffs a cause of action under the statute. Because section 10(b) covers the
broad area of fraud, it often applies to conduct which also might be actionable under the express remedy provisions of the Securities Act of
1933 ('33 Act) or the '34 Act.' The Supreme Court has declined to determine whether a party may assert an implied private right of action
under section 10(b) when the alleged illegal acts of the defendant might
' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b) of the '34 Act, see
note 1 supra, by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under'which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) Ta engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purpose or
sale of any security.
I The district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first implied a private
right of action under § 10(b) of the '34 Act in 1946. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Although a majority of courts soon recognized the private
right of action under § 10(b), e.g., Fratt. v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953);
Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), the Supreme Court did not affirm
the existence of such a right until 1971. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).

'
FRAUD

See generally 1 A.

BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES

§§ 2.4(2)-.5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

BROMBERG & LOWENFELS].

938

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII

have been actionable under an express liability provision.' Recently,
however, several lower federal courts have dealt with the question of
whether an implied right of action exists under section 10(b) when an express remedy prescribes the defendant's conduct.6
Congress provided several express remedies in both the '33 Act and
the '34 Act. Congress enacted the '33 Act to regulate the sale of newly
issued securities.' The Act was specifically designed to provide full and
fair disclosure of the character of the securities sold and to prevent
fraud in the sale of the securities.' Although Congress provided primarily for government enforcement in the '33 Act, Congress also supplied three express private remedies to investors.9 The restrictive
nature of the express liability provisions reflects a congressional concern that the remedies not upset the new issues market."0 The philosophy of Congress in enacting the express remedies was deterrence rather
than compensation."
To further the requirement of accurate disclosure,'" Congress provided for an express private remedy in section 11 of the '33 Act.' 3 Section 11 subjects issuers of registered securities and other persons" to
civil liability for false statements or omissions of material facts in a
I See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.31 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 n.15 (1975).
' E.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,712 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.,
607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
' See Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976)).
' See id. The goal of the '33 Act was investor protection. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Congress sought to protect investors through a general antifraud provision and a registration provision. See L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 179-80 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. The disclosure provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) require not only accuracy but also the disclosure of
significant matters which rarely had been disclosed previously. See Shulman, Civil Liability
and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Shulman].
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o (1976); see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933).
" Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752-53 (1975). In the 1934
amendments, Congress further restricted the already-limited remedies of the '33 Act. Id.;
see 78 CONG. REC. 8668-69 (1934); notes 17, 24 and 26 infra. The 1934 amendments were a
response to pressure from the securities industry. See James, Amendments to the
Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1130, 1130 (1934). See generally M. PARRISH,
SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL (1970).
" Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 567
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); see Douglas & Bates, The FederalSecurities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171,
172-73 (1933) (penalty must be severe to make truth-telling requirement effective); Shulman,
supra note 8, at 227, 253 (adequate deterrence eliminates need for compensation).
"1See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933); note 8 supra.
,' 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
14 Potential § 11 defendants include persons signing the registration statement, persons preparing or certifying the registration statement or a connected document, and the
underwriter. Id. See generally Fiflis, Liabilityfor Misleading Statements under Section 11,
21 PRAC. LAW. 35, 38-40 (1975).
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registration statement. 15 Recognizing that facts relating to misstatements and omissions are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, Congress placed the burden on the defendant to prove that he did
not make false statements or fail to include material facts.16 Except for a
narrow exception, section 11 does not compel the purchaser to prove
that he relied on the registration statement.17 Further, section 11 does
not require proof of scienfter since liability depends on the existence of
the statement or omission, rather than the intentions or good faith of the
defendants.18
Congress was careful to limit the scope of section 11 liability. Only a
defrauded purchaser of newly registered securities may sue under section 11."9 The plaintiff is limited to recovery within a detailed measureof-damages formula." In addition, the defendant has several affirmative
defenses. The defendant will be absolved of liability if he exercised due
diligence2 or if the plaintiff knew of the untruth or omission.22 The causa,5 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
,6See id § 77(b); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
,715 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). In the 1934 amendments to the '33 Act, Congress stipulated
that the plaintiff must prove reliance if he acquired the security after the issuer had submitted an earnings statement covering a period of at least 12 months after the effective
date of the registration statement. Title II of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, §
206, 48 Stat. 907; see H.R. REP. No. 1038, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934) (amendment based on
likelihood that purchase of securities after publication of statement will be based on statement).
,) Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951); Simpson,
Investors' Civil Remedies Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 71, 72-73
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Simpson].
" Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967); Abrams v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,305, at 97,089-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see 3
Loss, supra note 8, at 1731 n.160.
' 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976). The purchaser may recover for damages suffered as a
result of a decline in the security's value, in an amount not exceeding the price at which the
security was offered to the public. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933)
(greater allowance for damages would unnecessarily restrain conscientious business administration).
21 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976). The "due diligence" defense is not available to the
issuer. Id. § 77k(b). The defense imposes a stringent standard of care on a defendant regarding the portions of a registration statement which were not made on the authority of an expert. Id. The § 11 defendant must establish that he conducted a reasonable investigation
and therefore had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, the accuracy of the nonexpertised portions of the registration statement. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A); see id. § 77k(c)
(reasonableness standard that of prudent man managing own property). The district court
in Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), indicated that
"reasonable investigation" requires that the defendant independently verify the registration statement by referring to original written records. Id. at 690; accord, Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 576-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The "reasonable investigation" requirement varies according to the defendant's status, with inside directors
and underwriters subject to particularly stringent investigation requirements. 332 F. Supp.
at 577-78. See generally Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts-The
Barchris Case (pt. 1), 55 VA. L. REV. 1 (1969); Comment, Barchris: Due Diligence Refined, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1411 (1968).
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976).
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tion provision of section 11 permits the defendant to prove that outside
factors, rather than his misstatement or omission, accounted for some or
all of the security's price decline." Section 11 also has restrictive procedural requirements, including a short statute of limitations,24 limited
venue, 25 and the grant of judicial discretion to require plaintiffs to post a
security bond for costs."
In addition to insuring the accuracy of the registration statement's
contents, Congress provided express remedies to insure that companies
register their stock issues and that the representations accompanying
the registration statement are accurate. Section 12(1) of the '33 Act imposes liability on an issuer, underwriter, or dealer who fails to register a
security when registration is required under the '33 ActY Since the
plaintiff does not have to prove scienter or defend against allegations
regarding his own knowledge, failure to register a security when so required results in absolute liability under section 12(1.28 Under section
12(2) of the '33 Act, any person who sells securities by means containing
material misstatements or omissions may be liable.2 9 Unlike section 11,
section 12(2) covers transactions in outstanding securities as well as

' Id. § 77k(e). Commentators originally believed that § li's causation provision offered
little opportunity for reducing damages because of the difficulty of proving what caused a
security to decline in value in the open market. E.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS

1027 (3d ed. 1972). Recent courts, however, have

recognized that the provision may reduce defendants' damages occurring during periods of
general market decline. E.g., Beecher v. Able, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) J 95,016, at 97,559-60 (S.DN.Y. 1975); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544, 586-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally Note, Causation of Damages Under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 217 (1976).
"4 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976). Section 13 of the '33 Act specifies the statute of limitations
for §§ 11, 12 and 15. Id. Congress amended § 13 in 1934, reducing the period of limitations
from two years to one year after discovery and from ten years to three years within the
time of offer or sale of the security. Compare Title II of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, ch. 404, § 207, 48 Stat. 908 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976)) with Securities Acts of
1933, ch. 38, § 13, 48 Stat. 84. The plaintiff must bring a § 11 action within one year after
discovery of the violation and within three years after the issuer first offered the security
to the public. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976).
' 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976). Venue lies where the defendant is found, resides, or transacts business, or where the offer or sale took place. Id.
' Id. § 77k(e). Section 11(e) authorizes a court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit
under §§ 11, 12 or 15 to post a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees, and in specified circumstances to assess costs at the conclusion of the litigation. Id. Until Congress amended §
11(e) in the '34 amendments to the '33 Act, § 11(e) contained no provision for payment of
costs. Compare Title II of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 206(e), 48 Stat. 907
with Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 11(e), 48 Stat. 83. Congress amended § 11(e) to deter
plaintiffs from bringing actions solely for their potential settlement value. See H.R. REP. No.
1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 8669 (1934).
15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976).

See 3A H. B LOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 8.04 (1980); R.
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 839 (4th ed. 1977).
- 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).

JENNINGS &
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distribution." Congress placed the burden on the defendant to prove
that he did not make the false statements or fail to disclose material
facts."
Congress carefully limited the scope of section 12 liability. A purchaser may sue only his immediate seller for violations of section 12.11
Because of this "strict privity" requirement, the purchaser may sue the
issuer of a security under section 12(2) only if he purchased from an
agent or "control person" of the issuer." The potential availability, of
several defenses further limits section 12(2). The defendant will not be
liable if the plaintiff fails to prove his own lack of knowledge of the
misstatement or omission. 4 In addition, the section 12(2) defendant may
absolve himself from liability if he proves that he did not know about the
misstatements or omissions, and could not have learned the truth by the
exercise of reasonable care. 5 Congress imposed restrictive provisions on
section 12 concerning its statute of limitations, 8 venue,37 and security
bond requirements. 8 If a plaintiff can satisfy the restrictive elements of
a section 12(2) action, his damages are limited to recission and recovery
of the consideration paid for the security with interest, or recovery of
damages if he no longer owns the security. 9
5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5, § 3.01[c], at 1-43 (rev. ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as JACOBS].
S, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
, Id § 771; Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968); 3 Loss, supra note 8,
at 1719. Only immediate sellers are liable under § 12, since Congress provided a specific
remedy against an issuer under § 11. Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir.
1979). Several courts have recognized, however, that the term "seller" under § 12 may include more thap just the person who passes title. See, e.g., Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F.
Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (defendant liable if conduct directly and proximately caused
plaintiff's injury); accord, Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,
692-93 (5th Cir. 1971) (promoters of nationwide franchise operation liable under § 12(1)); In re
Caesars Palace Secs. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 378-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (aider and abettor
liable under § 12(2)). See generally Rapp, Expanded Liability Under Section 12 of the
Securities Act: When is a Seller Not a Seller?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 445 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976); see note 39 infra (definition of "control person").
' 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
Id. One commentator has suggested that the "reasonable care" defense under § 12(2)
involves the same requirements as the "due diligence" defense under § 11. Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the FederalSecurities Acts: The Barchris Case (pt. 2), 55 VA. L. REV. 199,
207-16 (1969); see note 21 supra.
' 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976); see note 24 supra. A plaintiff must bring a § 12(1) action
within one year after the violation and within three years after the seller first offered the
security to the public. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976); see Russell v. Travel Concepts Corp.,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,230, at 98,217 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (rejecting argument that statute begins to run with plaintiff's discovery of alleged violation). A
plaintiff must bring a § 12(2) action within one year after discovery of the misrepresentation
and within three years of the sale. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976); see Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F.
Supp. 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (action must be brought within one year after reasonably
diligent plaintiff could have discovered misrepresention).
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976); see note 25 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); see note 26 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976). A § 12 plaintiff may recover only recissionary damages, unless
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In the '34 Act, Congress established a complementary scheme to the
'33 Act by regulating post-distribution trading on stock exchanges and
securities trading markets." The '34 Act was designed to protect public
investors by requiring that issuers continually disclose detailed information about their securities and by regulating the open market trading of
those securities. 41 Congress again gave primary enforcement responsibilities to the government, but provided three express civil remedies
in sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18.42 In response to pressure from the corporate sector, Congress limited severely the scope of these express
liability provisions. 3 Congress intended the remedies to deter illicit
practices, rather than to compensate injured parties.4
Section 9(e) of the '34 Act imposes liability on any person who willfully engages in manipulative activities in connection with securities
registered on exchanges.45 In addition to willfulness,46 a plaintiff must
show that the manipulation actually affected the price at which he
bought or sold the security. If he satisfies these elements, the plaintiff
he already has disposed of the stock. Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756, 757 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). Congress imposed a recissionary damage remedy on § 12 because of the section's
strict privity requirement. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
In addition to the express remedies of §§ 11 and 12, Congress imposed civil liability on
"control persons" under § 15 of the '33 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976); see Note, Vicarious
Liability of ControllingPersons Under the Securities Acts, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 151, 155-57
(1977) (courts define "control persons" on basis of status or control over transaction or institution through which perpetrator acted). Section 15 provides for secondary liability on
the part of control persons for violations of §§ 11 and 12, rather than creating a direct cause
of action against control persons. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o (1976); Turner v. First Wis. Mortgage
Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 913 (E.D. Wis. 1978). Congress provided an affirmative defense
under § 15 based on the defendant's lack of knowledge of the misstatement or omission. 15
U.S.C. § 77o (1976); see Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1968) (control person
satisfies defense if he exercises reasonable care of prudent person).
" See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1974); 1 Loss. supra
note 8, at 130-31.
41 See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1934).
1215 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r (1976); see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
433 Loss, supra note 8, at 1746-47; Cohen, "Truth in Securities"Revisited,79 HARV.L.
REV. 1340, 1369 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]. Professor Loss has stated that Congress
"watered down" the strength of the express remedies in the '34 Act to avoid the possibility
that corporations would strike against listing their securities on stock exchanges. 3 Loss,
supra note 8, at 1746-47. Due to their watered-down nature, the express remedies of the '34
Act have been "somewhat ineffective" in deterring fraudulent and deceptive conduct. Id.;
see Note, The Exclusivity of the Express Remedy Under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845, 847 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Express
Remedy].
" See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934).
'" 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
46 Section 9(e) is the only civil liability provision in the securities acts that contains the
requirement of willfulness. See 3 Loss, supra note 8, at 1749.
'" 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
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may recover damages. Section 9(e) limits damages, however, to losses
resulting directly from the unlawful price manipulation. 8 Finally, the
plaintiff must satisfy the section's statute of limitations provision 9 and
any court-imposed security bond for costs.
Section 16(b) of the '34 Act allows the issuer of a security to recover
all short-swing profits from insiders.' Congress designed section 16(b) to
prevent the unfair use of information which an insider may have obtained through his relationship with the issuer.2 The remedy is relatively free of the restrictive provisions characteristic of other express
remedies under the securities acts. Liability is automatic upon plaintiff's
proof that the insider profited on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of his corporation's securities within a six month period. 53 A
security holder suing on behalf of the issuer under section 16(b) may collect attorneys' fees," and is not required to post security for costs.55 A section 16(b) plaintiff must, however, bring the action within two years
after the date the insider realized the profit. 6
Section 18 of the '34 Act provides a right of action against persons
who have made misstatements or omissions" in any application, report,8
or document filed with the SEC pursuant to the '34 Act or SEC Rules.
"sId. Section 9(e) also provides that persons liable shall have a right of contribution
from any person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same
payment. Id.
SId. A plaintiff must bring a § 9(e) action within one year after discovery of the facts
constituting the violation and within three years after the actual manipulation. Id.
' Id.; see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934) (defendant must show that action was brought in bad faith before court should impose costs on plaintiff).
', 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Section 16(b) authorizes a private remedy by which the
issuer may recover any profit gained by the insider through a short swing transaction. Id.
The section does not, however, make the insider's transaction unlawful. See Bloomenthal,
Market-Makers, Manipulatorsand Shell Games, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 597, 631 n.132 (1971).
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1934).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). An insider's transaction may violate § 16(b) even though
the insider did not use inside information and acted in good faith. JACOBS. supra note 30, §
3.02[g], at 1-100; see Hearings on Stock Exchange PracticesBefore the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934) (remarks of T. Corcoran) (§ 16(b) is
"crude rule of thumb" because of difficulty of proving insider's intent).
' JACOBS, supra note 30, § 3.02[g], at 1-100; see Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (potential recovery of attorneys' fees may
provide sole stimulus for § 16(b)'s enforcement).
3ACOBS, supra note 30, § 3.02[g], at 1-100.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
', Congress intended that the language of § 18 encompass omissions as well as
misrepresentations. In re Pennsylvania Cent. Secs. Litigation, 357 F. Supp. 869, 876-77 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1934).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). The '34 Act requires the filing of a wide variety of
documents with the SEC. Section 13(a) contains the most important reporting requirement.
Under § 13(a), most publicly held companies must submit an annual report on Form 10-K and
provide other financial and nonfinancial information about their operations during the
course of a year. See id. § 78m. See generally 5 JACOBS, supra note 30, § 3.02[h] (discussion of
all filing requirements under '34 Act).
A majority of courts have held that § 18 is the "catch-all" civil liability provision for
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Congress carefully and narrowly drafted the language of section 18."
Section 18 liability does not extend to misleading documents filed with
any agency other than the SEC."° The section places upon the plaintiff a
difficult burden of proof. First, the plaintiff must prove that he saw and
relied on the misstatement in the report filed with the SEC.6 1 The plaintiff next must prove that the defendant's misrepresentation affected the
price of the security.2 In addition, the defendant may escape liability by
violations of the reporting requirements of the '34 Act and thus have refused to imply
private rights of action under the individual reporting requirements. See, e.g., DeWitt v.
American Stock Transfer Co., 433 F. Supp. 994, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (§§ 13(a) & 15(d));
Myers v. American Leisure Time Enter., Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd
mem., 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976) (§ 13 (d)); In re Pennsylvania Cent. Secs. Litigation, 347 F.
Supp. 1327, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affl'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974) (§ 13(a)).
Higgins, Section 18 of the Exchange Act: A New Defense Weapon in Securities
Litigation, 1980 DET. COLL. OF L. REV. 761, 763-64 [hereinafter cited as Higgins]. The careful
drafting of § 18 reflects Congress' concern with establishing a balance between affording an
adequate remedy to injured persons and, on the other hand, exposing corporations, directors and auditors to staggering liability because of their duty to file reports with the SEC.

Id.

, See Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1097-98 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(documents filed with Interstate Commerce Commission not actionable under § 18); Gann v.
Bernzomatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (misrepresentations in non-filed
documents not actionable under § 18). But cf. Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783,
788 (2d Cir. 1951) (imposing § 18 liability even though document filed only with stock exchange).
Section 18 liability also is limited within the class of documents which a company must
file with the SEC. See Note, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Putting the
Bite Back into the Toothless Tiger, 47 FORDHAm L. REV. 115, 128-31 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Toothless Tiger]. The SEC expressly has exempted Form 10-Q quarterly reports from
liability under § 18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-13(d) (1980). Annual reports are not "filed" for purposes of liability under § 18(a). Id. § 240.149-3(c).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). The § 18 plaintiff must establish "eye-ball" reliance on the
report which contains the misstatement or omission. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Barotz v. Monarch Gen., Inc., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,933, at 97,237 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Since § 11 contains a provision enabling the plaintiff to establish reliance "without proof of the reading" of
the particular document, courts have reasoned that the absence of such a provision in § 18
requires reliance on the actual document. 402 F.2d at 916 & n.6; see 3 Loss. supra note 8, at
1752. Several commentators believe, however, that the § 18 plaintiff should not be required
to establish "eye-ball" reliance.-See, e.g., 5 JACOBS, supra note 30, § 3.02[h], at 1-110 n.22
(1980) (sufficient if plaintiff read abstract of report or relied on security's market price); 2A
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 8.4(469) (1975) (sufficient if plaintiff saw relevant parts of
report in some other source); accord, Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F.
Supp. 518, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 3 Loss, supra note 8, at 1753 n.227 (may be sufficient if investor relies on information found through statistical services and otherwise). See generally
Higgins, supra note 59, at 774-81.
62 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976); see Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). The SEC considers the § 18(a) requirement that plaintiffs prove that the
defendant's misrepresentation affected the price of the security a major disincentive to the
use of § 18(a). See Loss, supra note 8, at 1753-54. In the 1941 amendments to the '34 Act, the
Commission unsuccessfully sought to strike the requirement. See SEC REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT

OF 1934, H.R. COMM.PRINT, COMM. ON INT. & FR. COMMERCE. 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1941).
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showing that he acted in good faith and without knowledge that the
statement was false or misleading. 3 Damages recoverable under section
18 do not include losses attributable to a general market decline. 4 A section 18 action is further subject to restrictive procedural requirements,
including a short statute of limitations 5 and the potential imposition of
security for costs and assessment of attorneys' fees.66
In addition to express remedies in the '33 and '34 Acts prohibiting
7
of the '34 Act. Congress I
fraud, Congressenacted section 10(b) as part
intended section 10(b) to grant the SEC66 the authority to enjoin
manipulative and deceptive conduct not otherwise prohibited by the '33
and '34 Acts. 5 Congress designed section 10(b) to permit the SEC to
regulate instances of fraud that were neither prevalent nor envisioned
by Congress in 1934. 70 Because a civil remedy under section 10(b) is a
' 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). The legislative history of the § 18 "good faith" defense indicates that the defendant's actions must be "something more than negligence" for the
plaintiff to recover. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211-12 n.31 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
Id. § 78r(c). A plaintiff must bring a § 18 action within one year of discovering the
facts constituting the cause of action and within three years after the cause of action accrues. Id.; see Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (cause of action "accrues" when transaction for which plaintiff seeks damages takes
place).
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Congress provided for the discretionary assessment of costs
and attorneys' fees under § 18 in order to protect against strike suits. See S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934). The defendant must show that the action was brought in bad
faith or is without merit before a court will impose costs on the plaintiff. Rhoadside v. Kenmore, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,958, at 97,290 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
In addition to the express remedies provided in §§ 9(e), 16(b), and 18 of the '34 Act, §
20(a) provides for the secondary liability of "control persons" for violations of the express
remedies. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). See generally Note, The Burden of ControLk Derivative
Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1019 (1973). A defendant is not liable under § 20(a) if he acted in good faith and did not induce directly or indirectly the act constituting the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976); see
Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 732-33 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (control person satisfies § 20(a)
good faith defense by proving that he took some precautionary measures to prevent plaintiff's harm).
- 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); see note 1 supra.
" Section 10(b) only provides expressly for SEC enforcement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934). The legislative history of § 10(b) does
not indicate that Congress considered the problem of private suits under the section at the
time of its enactment. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975); see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5-6 (1934); Note, Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 858, 860-61 (1948). Similarly, there is no indication that the SEC considered the question of private civil remedies in adopting rule 10b-5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. at 729-30; see Conference on Codification of the FederalSecuritiesLaws,
22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
11 2 Loss, supra note 8, at 3528 (Supp. 1969); see JACOBS, supra note 30, § 3 (Congress
recognized need for remedy in areas not expressly covered by '33 or '34 Act).
" See Hearingson Stock Exchange RegulationBefore the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (remarks of J. Landis) (§ 10(b) gives SEC

946

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII

creature of judicial implication, courts have been responsible for defining the elements of a section 10(b) action. 1 In establishing a claim under
section 10(b), a plaintiff must show that the defendant misstated or omitted a material fact that injured the plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff's purchase or sale of a security." The plaintiff has the burden of proving scienter.73 Although reliance is a required element in a section 10(b)
action, 4 courts presume reliance once a plaintiff establishes materiality75
or proves that the material misrepresentations affected the open market
price of the stock." Courts use the out-of-pocket rule, which looks to the
general power to prescribe regulation of any other manipulative devices); id. at 115
(remarks of T. Corcoran) (§ 10(b) is catch-all provision to enable SEC to deal with new
manipulative devices). See generally Ruder, CivilLiability UnderRule 10b-5: JudicialRevision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 627, 657-59 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Ruder].
" Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975).
72 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14
(1977) (material misstatement or omission required); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975) (plaintiff must be purchaser or seller of securities).
" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-214 (1976). A § 10(b) defendant acts
with scienter when he engages in "knowing or intentional" misconduct. Id. at 197. Most
courts and commentators consider reckless behavior sufficient to meet the scienter requirement. E.g., Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir. 1978); Sunstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977);
JACOBS, supra note 30, § 63, at 3-199 to -200; Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness"After Hochfelder and Aaron, 8 SECs. REG. L. J. 179, 181-82 (1980); Note, Recklessness Under Section 10b): Weathering the Hochfelder Storm, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 325, 343-44
(1977).
Prior to the Supreme Court's imposition of the scienter requirement in Hochfelder,
courts imposed a "due care" requirement on § 10(b) plaintiffs. See Note, Abrogation of
Plaintiff's Due Care Requirement in PrivateActions UnderRule 10b-5, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 399, 414 (1978). Under this requirement, a plaintiff would be denied recovery when
both parties acted negligently and the plaintiff failed to conduct an investigation which
would have revealed the defendant's misrepresentation. See id. After Hochfelder, however,
most courts have not required § 10(b) plaintiffs to establish "due care," since courts can no
longer impose liability on defendants for mere negligence. See id.; Note, Due Care: Still a
Limitation on 10b-5 Recovery?, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 122, 139 (1977).
" Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840
(1975); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 908 (1965).
" Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). See generally
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 584 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Reliance Requirement]. Most courts presume reliance
only when the defendant's fraudulent conduct involves material omissions rather than
misrepresentations. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1974,
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). But see note 76 infra. An omission is "material" if a
reasonable investor might have considered the omission important in making his investment decision. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153-54. If the omission is
material, the defendant may rebut the presumption of reliance by showing that the plaintiff
would not have acted differently even if the plaintiff had known the undisclosed material
facts. Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978).
11The Ninth and Second Circuits presume reliance in cases in which the deception has
inflated the price of securities traded in the open market. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,
906-07 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976; Schlich v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
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value received at the time of purchase, to determine damages under section 10(b)." The plaintiff in a section 10(b) action is entitled to a long
statute of limitations 78 and a broad venue option,79 and need not post

security for costs."s
507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). See generallyReliance Requirement supra note 75, at 592-96; Note, Proofof Reliance is Unnecessary in Open Market
Transactions Under 10b-5, 29 VAND. L. REV. 287 (1976). An individual reliance requirement
in cases involving fraud on the market would impose an unreasonable evidentiary burden on
a § 10(b) plaintiff. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d at 906.
" Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See generally Jacobs, The
Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L. J. 1093 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Measure of Damages]. Under § 10(b), a defrauded buyer may recover the fair value of the
consideration he paid for the security minus the actual value of the security, as measured at
the time of the transaction. Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971). When the
out-of-pocket rule fails to compensate the defrauded buyer for injuries which extend beyond
the initial bargain, however, a court may apply a recissionary damage remedy. See Garnatz
v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff recovered decline in
bonds' value until actual or constructive notice of fraud). But see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 49 n.22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (defendants
not liable for general market decline). Under the out-of-pocket rule, a defrauded seller may
recover the fair value of the stock he sold minus the purchase price received, as measured
at the time of the transaction. Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971). Recissionary damages may be available. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
155 (1972). See generally Note, Rule 10b-5 Damages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 76 (1975).
"' Section 10(b) does not contain an express statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976). Consequently, federal courts apply the limitations period available under the law of
the forum state. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976). Courts differ as
to whether to apply the limitations period in the state blue sky law or the state statute of
limitations for common-law fraud. Block & Barton, Statute of Limitations in Private Actions Under Section 101b) - A Proposalfor Achieving Uniformity, 7 SECS. REG. L. J. 374,
375 (1980); see, e.g., Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1979) (applied
six year limitations period of New Jersey's common law fraud remedy); Ohio v. Peterson,
Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 406 (D. Colo. 1979) (applied three year limitations period of Colorado's blue sky statute). Courts frequently choose the longer statute of
limitations in order to maximize the investor protection function of the securities laws.
Note, SecuritiesActions: EquitableDefenses and the Good Faith Defense for "Controlling
Persons," 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1173, 1192 (1976). Courts may extend the limitations period
indefinitely by use of the federal tolling doctrine. Under this doctrine, the limitations period
does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud or at least
of facts sufficient to put him on notice that he has been victimized. See Arneil v. Ramsey,
550 F.2d 774, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1977) (§ 10(b) statute of limitations does not begin to run until
plaintiffs should have discovered general fraudulent scheme); Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993,
996 (7th Cir. 1974) (investor using due diligence in attempting to discover fraudulent
scheme may invoke federal tolling doctrine in § 10(b) suits).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Section 27 of the '34 Act, which applies to § 10(b), is
similar to the venue provisions for §§ 11 and 12(2) of the '33 Act in permitting venue
wherever the defendant is located, resides, or transacts business, or where the offer or sale
took place. Id.; see note 25 supra.In addition, § 27 allows venue in any district where an act
or transaction constituting a violation occurred. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
"o Courts may not require a § 10(b) plaintiff to post security for costs and expenses. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 830 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961);
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1951). In addition, a district
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Because of the restrictions in the express remedies of the '33 and '34
Acts, plaintiffs soon pressed courts to imply private rights of action
under other sections of the securities acts for conduct that the express
provisions proscribed.1 Courts liberally construed these sections and the
Supreme Court even urged the lower courts to imply private rights of
action to further the remedial purposes of the securities acts.82 During
this period, plaintiffs particularly sought an implied remedy under section 10(b) of the '34 Act, because of the section's open-ended nature and
ease of proof. 3 Courts freely granted an implied private right of action
under section 10(b), reasoning that the express remedies and the section
10(b) implied remedy were cumulative. 4 The courts occasionally admitted that this construction indicated that Congress, in drafting the '34
Act, completely ignored or nullified the carefully drawn procedural
restrictions of the '33 Act.85 Nevertheless, the courts justified the implication of a private right of action under section 10(b) by noting that
the implied remedy was consistent with the congressional policy of providing complete sanctions" and permitted the more recent '34 Act to
govern in areas of overlap. 7
court may award attorneys' fees under § 10(b) only in rare instances. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210-11 n.30 (1975). Under the "American Rule," the prevailing
party seldom can recover attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory authorization. Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270-71 (1975); see F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1974) (may award attorneys' fees to prevailing party when opponent acted in bad faith).
" See generally JACOBS. supra note 30, § 3.
' J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). In Borak, the Supreme Court implied
a private right of action under § 14(a) of the '34Act. Id. at 431-32. The court reasoned that
the SEC alone could not fully enforce § 14(a), and held that the goals of the '34 Act required
implication of a private remedy. Id. at 432-33. The Borak Court encouraged lower courts to
imply private remedies under other sections of the securities laws. Id. at 433.
" Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878, 881 (D. Mass. 1973).
E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284
F.2d 670, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Rosen v. Bergman, 40 F.R.D. 19, 21-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946); cf., Gilbert v. Nixon,
429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970) (noting.that buyer could have § 10(b) action, but adopting
elements of § 12 when plaintiff sued under §§ 10(b) and 12). But see Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124-25 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (§ 10(b) inapplicable when § 11 or § 12 action available); Montague v. Electronic Corp. of Am., 76 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (§
10(b) action inapplicable when § 11 or § 12 action available).
" E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961); Orn v. Eastman Dillon, Union
Secs. & Co., 364 F. Supp. 352, 354-55 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
'6 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1961). Courts imputed a broad congressional intent to § 10(b) on the basis of § 10(b)'s language and the remedial purposes of the
securities act. E.g., Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 51
(7th Cir. 1968).
" Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). Courts characteristically asserted
practical justifications for implication of a private right of action under § 10(b). See id.;
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951). The Ninth Circuit noted in
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Recently, the Supreme Court's liberal attitude toward implication of
private remedies has changed. The Court has'abandoned its expansive
remedial philosophy in favor of a strict analysis designed to ascertain
whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action under the
statute.88
An initial indication that the Court was adopting a more restrictive
approach to implying a private right of action occurred in 1974. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad
89
Passengers (Amtrak),
the Court refused to imply a private right of action under section 307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970
because the section provided for a public action by the Attorney
General." The Court invoked the restrictive maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which holds that
whenever Congress provides a specific remedy in one section of a
statute, the omission of other remedies implies a legislative intent that
the specified remedy be exclusive. The Court stated that the expressio
principle would yield only to clear evidence of contrary legislative intent. 2
The Supreme Court continued the restriction of implied private
Ellis that implication of a § 10(b) action would require no variances under the '34 Act between the buyer and the seller. 291 F.2d at 274. In Fischman, the Second Circuit stated that
if § 11 were held to be an exclusive remedy, private plaintiffs could not proceed against "insiders" who induce investors to purchase common stock by placing fraudulent statements in
documents filed with the SEC. 188 F.2d at 787. Other justifications for implication of a §
10(b) private remedy are less availing. See, e.g., Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681, 684
(N.D. Ill. 1976) (implication of § 10(b) remedy because Congress would have stated so expressly if it had intended express remedies to be exclusive); Orn v. Eastman Dillon, Union
Secs. & Co., 364 F. Supp. 352, 355 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (implication of § 10(b) remedy because § 28
of '34 Act provides that '34 Act remedies "shall be in addition to any and all other rights
that may exist at law").
" See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-17 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-77 (1979); see text accompanying notes
124-30 infra.
414 U.S. 453 (1974).
Id. at 458-59.
91 Id. Literally, expressio unius est exclusio alterius means "the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979); see Botany
Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1929) ("when a statute limits a thing to
be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode"). The exclusio
principle has been widely criticized. See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344, 350-51 (1943); Matheson v. Ambrust, 284 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365

U.S. 870 (1961);

HART & SACKS.

THE LEGAL PROCESS

1173-74 (temp. ed. 1958); 2A

§ 47.25 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973)
[hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND]; Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285, 290-91 (1963).
9 414 U.S. at 458; see Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). The
legislative history of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 disclosed a congressional intent
to deny private actions that the Act did not specifically authorize. 414 U.S. at 461-62. The
Amtrak Court therefore applied the exclusio doctrine to deny the implied remedy. See id.
SUTHERLAND,
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rights of action in Cort v. Ash." Cort established a four-factor test for
determining whether an implied right exists under a statute. 4 Under the
first Cort factor, a court must ascertain whether the plaintiff is a
member of the class for whose special benefit Congress enacted the
federal statute. 5 The second Cort factor requires an examination of the
statute's legislative history to determine whether Congress intended explicitly or implicitly to create or deny a private cause of action. 6 The
third Cort inquiry requires a court to decide whether an implied private
right is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme. 7 Finally, the court must determine if the cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law. 8 The Supreme Court strictly applied each criterion in Cort and created a presumption against implication. 9 The Court failed to specify, however, whether the four factors
were of equal weight and whether all the factors must be satisfied
before a court should imply a private remedy.
During the 1979 term, the Supreme Court further refined and
restricted its approach toward the implication of private remedies. In
Cannon v. University of Chicago,' the Court implied a private remedy
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.11 The Court
focused on the first Cort factor, reasoning that the "right or dutycreating" language of a statute is the most accurate indicator of whether
a court should imply a private right of action. °2 The Court held that a
private right of action should be implied only when the language of the
statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a specific class that included the plaintiff. °3 In emphasizing this point, the Court explicitly
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Id. at 78.
9s Id.; see Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). Decisions prior to Cort had
not limited implication to plaintiffs who were the principal beneficiaries of a statute. E.g.,
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964).
" 422 U.S. at 78; see Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). In Cort, the Court stated when
the statute grants certain rights to a class of persons including the plaintiff, the statute's
legislative history need not show an intent to create a private action to permit implication.
422 U.S. at 82. An explicit legislative intent to deny a private action would, however, be controlling. Id.
97 422 U.S. at 78; see Securities Inv. Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423
(1975); Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
98 422 U.S. at 78.
Id. at 79-85; see Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal Statutes: From
Borak to Ash, 1 J. CORP. L. 371, 387 (1976).
.' 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
', Id. at 717.
,o, Id. at 690 n.13. In addition to defining the first Cort factor, the Cannon Court appeared to note the demise of the Amtrak Court's exclusio principle. See 441 U.S. at 711;
note 91 supra. But see text accompanying note 131 infra. The Cannon Court found that the
existence of express remedies in a complex legislative framework was not "sufficient reason
for refusing to imply an otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate section." 441 U.S.
at 711.
'"' 441 U.S. at 690 n.13.
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stated that statutes creating duties for the benefit of the public at large
do not evidence congressional intent to create a private cause of
action.0 4
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, °1 the Supreme Court modified
the Cort test and reaffirmed its restrictive posture toward implied
private rights of action under federal securities laws. In considering
whether to imply a private right under section 17(a) of the '34 Act, the
Redington Court focused on the first three Cort factors, since those factors are the traditional indicia of legislative intent."6 The Court considered whether plaintiffs were members of the class sought to be pro08
and the legislative history of the
tected by section 17(a), °7 the language"
9
section," and the statutory scheme of the '34 Act.10 Since analysis of the
first three Cort factors failed to disclose legislative intent to provide a
private remedy under section 17(a), the Court declined to consider
whether the private remedy sought was traditionally relegated to state
law."' The Redington Court thus indicated for the first time that the
four elements of the Cort test do not deserve equal weight.1 The Court
concluded that the primary consideration is whether Congress intended
to create a private right of action.1
104Id. In Cannon, the Court noted that its previous implication of a private right of ac-

tion under § 10(b) of the '34 Act had not followed the general pattern of refusing to imply a
private right under a statute creating duties for the benefit of the public at large. Id.; see
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (recognition of §
10(b) private cause of action). The Cannon Court found that widespread lower court acceptance of an implied right of action under § 10(b) was the cause of the deviation. 441 U.S. at
690 n.13.
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
104 Id at 568-74.
Id- at 569-71. Section 17(a) of the '34 Act expressly protects investors. Id. at 569. The
term "investors" includes only purchasers and sellers of securities. Id. at 574. Since the
Redington plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities, the Supreme Court
concluded that the plaintiffs were not members of the class sought to be protected by §
17(a). Id. at 576.
1 Id at 568-71. The Redington Court concluded that the language of § 17(a) of the '34
Act did not purport to create a private right of action. Id. at 571. Section 17(a) contained no
prohibition on which to found an implied right of action. Id. at 569.
10 Id. at 571. The legislative history of the '34 Act is silent on the availability of a
private remedy under § 17(a). Id. Since the statutory language weighed against implication,
see note 108 supra, the Redington Court interpreted the absence of legislative history as a
further indication of congressional intent to deny an implied private right of action. 442 U.S.
at 571.
"1 442 U.S. at 571. The Redington Court, in accordance with the third Cort factor, examined the legislative scheme of the '34 Act. Id. The Court recognized that implied rights
under § 17(a) were inconsistent with the framework of the '34 Act. Id. at 571-74; see text accompanying notes 131-34 infra.
" 442 U.S. at 575-76.
112

Id

"I Id. at 575-77. The Redington Court observed that the judiciary should not imply a
private remedy without adequate evidence of congressional intent to infer that private
right. Id. at 574. The Court reasoned that a contrary position would infringe upon Congress'
legislative power. Id. at 577-79.
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The Supreme Court further narrowed the focus of the Cort test in
TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis."4 In Transamerica,the
Court implied a private right of action under section 215 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, but refused to accept the plaintiff's implication claim under section 206."15 The Court premised its analysis of the implication issues upon basic statutory construction." 6 The Court emphasized that the appropriate inquiry is whether Congress intended to
create the piivate cause of action asserted."7 Accordingly, the Transamerica Court selected the second Cort factor as the initial inquiry
under its implication analysis." 8 Following Redington, the Transamerica
Court reorganized the second prong of the Cort test to include examination of statutory language and legislative history." 9 If neither language
nor legislative sources reveal a congressional intent to imply a private
right of action, the inquiry ends with a denial of private rights."' Once
the statute satisfies the initial level of the modified Cort test, a court
must consider the third Cort factor to determine whether implying a
private right is consistent with the purpose of the statute.'2 ' When the
foregoing factors indicate that Congress did not intend to imply a
private right of action, a court does not need to consider the fourth Cort
factor."' The determination of whether an adequate state remedy exists,
however, remains a part of the modified Cort test if the statute satisfies
the preceding factors."' The Transamericadecision, therefore, reorders
and redefines the original Cort factors to create a more restrictive implication test.
Taken together, Redington and Transamerica indicate that the
Supreme Court has adopted a two-step test for determining whether to
imply a private right of action."' A court should consider initially
whether Congress intended to create a private remedy in favor of the
plaintiff."' In determining legislative intent, the court should examine
"1444 U.S. 11 (1979).
.,.
Id. at 23-24.
,,.
Id. at 16.
117 1&

, Id. at 15-17.
,19
I& at 16-22; see notes 108-09 supra. Originally, the Court examined only the
legislative history of a statute under the second Cort factor to determine whether Congress
intended to provide a private remedy. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78. The TransamericaCourt
recognized that congressional intent may be implicit in the structure of a statute or the circumstances of its enactment. 444 U.S. at 18.
120 444 U.S. at 23-24.
1 Id.; see note 128 infra.
' 444 U.S. at 23-24. The TransamericaCourt rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a
court must always consider the fourth Cort factor and reiterated that the Cort factors are
not of equal weight. IM; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 575-76.
11 444 U.S. at 23-24.
...
See id. at 24; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 575-76.
12 444 U.S. at 24; 442 U.S. at 575-77.
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whether the statute creates a distinct federal right in the plaintiff2 ' and
whether the legislative history and language of the statute indicate that
Congress intended to provide a private remedy." The court should
determine also whether implication of a private right of action would be
consistent with the legislative scheme." If the court's legislative intent
analysis indicates that Congress did not intend to provide a private
remedy, the court should not imply a private right of action." 9 If Congress intended to create a private remedy, however, the court should
determine further whether implication of a federal remedy would be inappropriate given traditional state law coverage of defendant's alleged
conduct.130
In attempting to discern the now-critical element of legislative intent, the Supreme Court has indicated that the presence of an express
remedy in other sections of a statute is significant. In Redington and
Transamerica,the Court apparently has resurrected the Amtrak Court's
restrictive exclusio principle of statutory construction.' In Redington,
12 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-94 (1979); see text accompanying
notes 102-04 supra.
"7 444 U.S. at 18; 442 U.S. at 568-71; see notes 108-09 and 119 supra.
126442 U.S. at 575-76. The Court has wavered on the question whether implication must
be "necessary" to the accomplishment of the legislative objective or merely "consistent"
with the purpose of the statutory scheme. Compare Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. at 703 ("necessary or at least helpful") and Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,
39-41 (1977) ("necessary") with Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) ("consistent"). The better
view is that the Court's occasional concern'with the "necessity" of a remedy is directed
generally toward the feasibility of implication, rather than specifically toward the third
Cort factor. See Steinberg, Implied PrivateRights of Action UnderFederalLaw, 55 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 33, 48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg]. The legislative intent inherent in
the statutory scheme will often differ from the statute's broad legislative objectives. Id. The
Supreme Court's current emphasis on legislative intent, rather than on furthering a
statute's remedial purposes, indicates that the Court has modified the third Cort factor to
require an examination df the statutory scheme. See 442 U.S. at 571, 574-75; text accompanying notes 131-35 infra.

"26444 U.S. at 24; 442 U.S. at 575-76.

442 U.S. at 575-76; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
444 U.S. at 19; 442 U.S. at 572. Redington and Transamericarevived the exclusio
doctrine from its apparent demise in Cannon. See Steinberg, supra note 128, at 47-48; note
102 supra.
The Supreme Court also has adopted reasoning similar to the exclusio principle in tworecent decisions limiting the scope of an implied right of action under § 10(b) of the '34 Act.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), and Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court based its decisions primarily on the plain
language of § 10(b). 425 U.S. at 199 (§ 10(b) applies only to willful and knowing acts; 421 U.S.
at 732-33 (§ 10(b) standing limited to purchasers or seller of securities). .The Supreme Court
buttressed its conclusion in Blue Chip Stamps, however, by emphasizing that the express
liability provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts were limited to purchasers and sellers of
securities and were enacted contemporaneously with § 10(b). 421 U.S. at 736. The Court
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to create a broader class of plaintiffs in an
implied right of action than it had created under the express liability sections. I& In
Hochfelder, the Court refused to exend the § 10(b) implied action to negligent conduct,
1SO

'
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the Supreme Court used the maxim to bolster its decision to not imply a
private remedy under section 17(a) of the '34 Act.13 The Court found that
the existence of an express remedy in another section, together with the
absence of contrary legislative intent, allowed rejection of an implied
private right of action. ' The Court indicated its extreme reluctance to
infer a private right of action from a statute if that inference would permit a plaintiff to avoid the substantive requirements of an express
liability provision in the same statute.'34 More recently, the Transamerica Court instructed that a court should be "chary" of reading an
implied remedy into a statute already providing an express remedy.' 35
The Court's current implication analysis thus requires a policy of
special caution when considering whether to imply a private right of action for conduct proscribed by an express remedy. The Court's approach
is designed to ascertain whether Congress intended to create a private
cause of action under a statute.' Express liability provisions elsewhere
in a statute apparently are an indication that Congress did not intend to
create a private right of action under another section."' Given the
relative lack of elaboration in the Supreme Court's opinions, however,
the lower federal courts have been free to formulate their own approaches to implication. A review of several of the most recent decisions
indicates that lower courts have vastly different approaches to implementing the Supreme Court's directive.
In Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 3' the Second Circuit recently adopted a
"nullification" approach and held that the existence of an express
remedy under section 18 of the '34 Act does not preclude implication of a
section 10(b) private right of action. 39 In Ross, the plaintiffs claimed that
the A.H. Robins Co. and its directors made material misstatements and
omissions about the safety and effectiveness of the "Dalkon Shield," a

noting that the express provisions of the '33 Act proscribing negligent misconduct contain
strict procedural requirements that could be negated if § 10(b) gave rise to an implied action
for negligence. 425 U.S. at 210.
"'

See 442 U.S. 572.

Id. The status of § 18(a) of the '34 Act as the "catch-all" liability provision for violations of the Act's reporting requirements encouraged rejection of the § 17(a) implied remedy
in Redington. See id. at 573-74.
" 442 U.S. at 572. In Redington, the Court reaffirmed its conviction that the inclusion
of an express remedy in the statute indicated that Congress knew how to include a remedy
and did so when it intended one to exist. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. at 734).
"1 444 U.S. at 19. The TransamericaCourt expressly cited the exclusio doctrine as
one reason for not implying a private right of action under § 206 of the Investment Advisors
Act. Id. at 19-20 (citing Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 458; Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278
U.S. at 289).
'3 See text accompanying notes 124-30 supra.
'3' See text accompanying notes 131-35 supra.
'3 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
'

"'

See id. at 556.
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birth control device manufactured and marketed by Robins.140 Robins'
annual report, year-end financial report, and a stock prospectus contained the alleged misrepresentations."' The plaintiffs charged that the
misrepresentations artificially inflated the prices of the company's
securities,' and sought relief under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5."'
Although the Ross plaintiffs sued under rule 10b-5, section 18 would
have provided an express cause of action for the defendants' conduct
since the alleged misrepresentations appeared in documents filed with
the SEC."' The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Congress intended section 18 to be the exclusive remedy for conduct proscribed by that section."
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court and concluded
that private plaintiffs may proceed under rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations in documents filed with the SEC." 6 In analyzing whether section 18
is an exclusive remedy, the court declined to employ the Supreme
Court's methodology for determining legislative intent in implied
private right of action cases." ' The Ross court reasoned that the
Supreme Court's analytical framework was inapplicable. 8 because
courts already recognize an implied right of action under section 10(b). 19
The court then examined several recent Supreme Court decisions, and
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that remedies in the securities acts
never are exclusive." ' Instead, the court adopted a "nullification" test
"I Id. at 547-50. The Ross plaintiffs alleged that the defendants recklessly disregarded
information indicating the inaccuracy of statements concerning the effectiveness of the
Dalkon Shield and that the defendants predicated their misrepresentations upon insufficient test data. Id. at 548-49. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to
correct their misrepresentations in a timely fashion. Id. at 550.
"Id. at 549. The plaintiffs in Ross alleged that the defendants' misrepresentations appeared in several press releases as well as in documents filed with the SEC. Id. Material
misrepresentations in press releases give rise to rule 10b-5 liability. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97-98 (10th Cir. 1971). Presumably, then, the Second Circuit did not
need to address the exclusiveness of the § 18 remedy.
"' 607 F.2d at 550. Subsequent to public disclosure of Dalkon Shield's ineffectiveness
and safety problems, the value of A.H. Robins Co. stock dropped from $19 to $13 share on
the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
13 Id.
24 Id. at 553; see text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
' Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The district court in
Ross analyzed the '34 Act's legislative scheme in holding that § 18 precludes that use of §
10(b). Id. The district court reasoned that the procedural and substantive requirements of §
18 manifested Congress' intention that § 18 serve as an exclusive remedy. Id.
14 607 F.2d at 555, 559; see text accompanying notes 153-67 infra.
"' 607 F.2d at 553; see text accompanying notes 124-30 supra.
"' 607 F.2d at 553.
249 Id.; see note 3 supra.
' 607 F.2d at 554. The Ross plaintiffs relied on the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v.
National Secs. 5, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969), as authority for the proposition that Congress
intended the remedies in the securities acts to overlap. 607 F.2d at 554. In National
Securities, the Court held that an overlap between § 10(b) and § 14 of the '34 Act does not
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which prohibits plaintiffs from invoking an implied remedy if the terms
of the implied remedy unjustifiably nullifies the procedural and substantive limitations of the competing express remedy.'51 The Ross court
reasoned that allowing an implied remedy where nullification exists
would encourage circumvention of the carefully drawn express remedies
included in the securities acts."'
The Second Circuit began its analysis by noting that plaintiffs seeking to establish reliance on misrepresentations face a more difficult task
under section 18 than under section 10(b).' 5' In a rule 10b-5 action, courts
presume reliance once a plaintiff establishes materiality. 4 or proves that
the material misrepresentations affected the open market price of the
stock." Under section 18, the plaintiff must plead and prove actual
reliance on the misrepresentation in purchasing or selling a security."6
The Second Circuit next reasoned that the plaintiff's burden of
establishing scienter 7 under section 10(b) offsets the relative advantage
of not having to prove actual reliance."8 Under rule 10b-5, the plaintiff
has the burden of averring specific facts which imply that the defendant
acted with scienter."'1 Under section 18, however, a plaintiff states a
cause of action merely by showing that a document filed with the SEC
contained a misrepresentation and that the plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation.'6 ' The Ross court found that this burden of proof
allocation adversely affects section 10(b) claims since plaintiffs may have
limit either remedy. 393 U.S. at 468. The Ross court recognized that recent Supreme Court
decisions have abrogated the liberal philosophy of NationalSecurities. 607 F.2d at 554; see
text accompanying notes 132-35 supra.
607 F.2d at 553.
,1, Id. at 554-55.
Id. at 552-53.
'56 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
15 See text accompanying note 76 supra.
11 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
15, See text accompanying note 73 supra.
607 F.2d at 556.
Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521-22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
In Ross, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege the specific
facts necessary to raise the inference of scienter. 607 F.2d at 558. The court found that the
plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that the defendants were aware of information which
raised serious doubts about the safety and effectiveness of the Dalkon Shield. Id. The Ross
court also found that the plaintiffs failed to allege when the defendants became aware of the
defects in the product. Id. Finally, the complaint failed to specify the time period during
which the price of Robins' stock fell. Id. at 559. The Second Circuit remanded Ross with instructions that the district court provide the plaintiffs leave to amend. Id.
"6 Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 190, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
3 Loss. supra note 8, at 1752. Technically, § 18 requires that a defendant act with scienter,
but the Supreme Court allows a presumption of the requisite mental state once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.31 (1976).
The burden in a § 18 action is on the defendant to prove the absence of scienter. See note 63
supra.
'
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difficulty alleging the specific facts necessary to survive a motion to
dismiss. 16' The Second Circuit thus concluded that defrauded investors
enjoy no substantive advantages by proceeding under section 10(b)
rather than under the express remedy of section 18.162
The Ross court also relied on policy considerations in holding that
section 18 is not an exclusive remedy. Initially, the court stated that
predicating the availability of rule 10b-5 upon misrepresentations in an
SEC filing might deny all remedies to some investors.'63 Finding that
open market investors have become one of the chief beneficiaries of rule
10b-5 protection,' the Second Circuit reasoned that the current Congress would not condone basing rule 10b-5 liability on such a
delineation. 6' Additionally, the court speculated that forcing plaintiffs to
proceed under section 18 rather than under section 10(b) would encourage officers and directors to incorporate their misrepresentations in
documents filed with the SEC.'66 The Second Circuit reasoned that such
incorporation would insulate these potential defendants from section
10(b) liability since once the misrepresentations appeared67in an SEC filing, section 18 would become the only available remedy.'
In Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing
Corp.,' the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.
Circuit) recently combined a "legislative intent" approach with the Ross
"nullification" test, in resolving a section 10(b) implication question.'69
The D.C. Circuit held that a court may imply a section 10(b) private right
of action for conduct proscribed by sections 11 and 12 of the '33 Act and
section 18 of the '34 Act. 70 In Wachovia, the plaintiffs sought damages to
remedy losses suffered when the value of National Student Marketing
Corp. (NSMC) stock dropped dramatically soon after the plaintiffs purchased a large quantity of NSMC stock. 17' The plaintiffs charged the
defendants with conspiracy to defraud investors by artificially inflating
16!

607 F.2d at 556.

Id.
M6The Ross court failed to address the impact of the procedural requirements in §

18. See text accompanying notes 275-85 infra.
" 607 F.2d at 556. Currently, many plaintiffs seek relief under rule 10b-5 for
misstatements in SEC filings because of an inability to satisfy the substantive or procedural
requirements of § 18. See 5 JACOBS, supra note 30, § 3.02[h], at 1-106. Thus, denying those
plaintiffs a remedy under rule 10b-5 effectively would preclude litigation of their claims

under the federal securities laws. 607 F.2d at 556.
1' 607 F.2d at 556; Thill Securities Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir. 1970); cf.,
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 769 775 (1979) (investors not exclusive beneficiaries of

'34 Act).
"6607 F.2d at 556.
"

Id.

167 Id

'
"G
"'
'

[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH)
See id. at 98,730-37.
Id at 98,737.
Id at 98,726.

97,712 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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the price of NSMC stock."' Specifically, plaintiffs contended that
misrepresentations about NSMC's financial condition appeared in oral
statements, press releases, published reports, and reports filed with
the SEC. 173 The plaintiffs sought relief under section 10(b) of the '34
Act. 4
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action, claiming that
the express remedies of the securities acts precluded any implied right
of action for private plaintiffs under section 10(b)."1 5 The defendants
asserted that section 18 of the '34 Act provided the plaintiffs a remedy,
since most of the alleged misstatements appeared in documents filed
with the SEC.'76 The defendants contended that the plaintiffs had an express remedy under section 12(2) of the '33 Act for misstatements contained in documents not filed with the SEC.' The district court held
that the plaintiffs did not have adequate remedies under either section
18(a) ' 8 or section 12(2),' and concluded that plaintiffs had stated a claim
under section 10(b) of the '34 Act.18'
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding of an implied private right of action under section 10(b) of the '34 Act.' 8' The
Wachovia court adopted a two-part approach. First, the court examined
whether an implied right of action generally exists under section 10(b).'82
172

Id at 98,727. Wachovia defendants included National Student Marketing Corp.

(NSMC) and several of its officers and employees. I& The plaintiffs also sued NSMC's independent auditor, several of the auditor's employees, and NSMC's outside counsel. Id
Plaintiffs settled with NSMC and various named defendants. Id.
173Id.
17 I& In addition to the § 10(b) claim, the Wachovia plaintiffs sought relief under § 17(a)
of the '33 Act, and §§ 13(a) and 14(a) of the '34 Act. Id175 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999,
1003 (D.D.C. 1978).
.7 I& at 1005.

177

Id.

178

Id. at 1005-06. The Wachovia plaintiffs did not allege reliance upon documents filed

with the SEC. Id Reliance upon documents filed with the SEC is critical to a claim under §
18(a). Id.; see text accompanying note 61 supra.
179 461 F. Supp. at 1006. Section 12(2) applies to negligent misstatements and omissions.
Id.; see text accompanying note 30 supra. The district court found that victims of intentional
fraud should not be limited to the negligence remedy in § 12(2). 461 F. Supp. at 1006. The
court also noted that § 12(2) did not apply because the present defendants were not "sellers"
of the securities. Id.; see text accompanying note 32 supra.
ISo 461 F. Supp. at 1007. The district court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs' § 10(b) action as untimely. Id. at 1013. The court ruled that the private action under § 10(b) of the '34
Act was subject to the two-year statute of limitations period found in the District of Columbia blue sky law. Id. at 1007-08.
181 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,712, at 98,737. The D.C. Circuit
reversed the district court's holding that the two-year period under the jurisdiction's blue
sky law was the appropriate statute of limitations. Id. The circuit court found that the plaintiffs' action was not time-barred under the District's applicable three-year limitations
period for general fraud claims. Id,
,12See id. at 98,730-33; text accompanying notes 184-94 infra.
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Finding that Congress intended to create an implied right of action
under section 10(b), the Wachovia court next analyzed whether the existence of express remedies elsewhere in the securities act required the
rejection of an implied remedy. 83'
The Wachovia court began its analysis by attempting to ascertain
Congress' intent in enacting the securities acts. Applying the Cort fourfactor test, 84' the D.C. Circuit first found that section 10(b) was designed
to benefit an "especial class" composed of investors. 8 The plaintiffs
were members of the broad investor class. 88 The court next examined
legislative history for evidence that Congress intended to imply a
remedy under section 10(b).' 87 Finding no clear legislative history of an
intent to imply the remedy, the court searched for indications that Congress meant to deny an implied remedy under section 10(b).' 88 Failing to
find a legislative intent to deny the implied remedy, the Wachovia court
considered whether a private remedy under section 10(b) was necessary
or helpful to accomplish the statutory purpose.'89 The court found that
the implied remedy was at least helpful in enforcing the remedial purposes of the securities acts.' While noting the relative lack of importance of the fourth Cort factor in ascertaining legislative intent, the
D.C. Circuit found that the federal securities acts traditionally controlled fraudulent conduct with national implications. 9 ' Application of
the Cort criteria convinced the court of Congress' implicit intent that a
private cause of action exists under section 10(b).
As an additional aid in ascertaining legislative intent, the Wachovia
court looked to the history of implication under section 10(b).' 9 ' The D.C.
"I See [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

97,712, at 98,733-36; text ac-

companying notes 195-202 infra.
1" [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,712, at 98,731. The D.C. Circuit
in Wachovia stated that recent Supreme Court decisions centered on the application of the
Cort factors. Id. n.22; see text accompanying notes 93-99 supra. But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Cort test should be discarded); Comment, Implied Rights of Action in FederalLegislation:Harmonization Within the
Statutory Scheme, 1980 DUKE L.J. 928, 934 n.26 (noting strong indications that Supreme
Court no longer considers Cort test restrictive enough).
"1

[1980 Transfer Binder]

FED. SEC.

L. REP. (CCH)

97,712, at 98,731.

I Id.
Id.
' Id. at 98,731-32. The Wachovia court interpreted Transamericato require judicial
consideration of whether Congress meant to deny a remedy, in the likely event that
legislative history was silent regarding implication. Id.
Il Id. at 98,732; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979).
11 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,712, at 98,732. The Wachovia
court reasoned that an implied right of action under § 10(b) assists in enforcing the remedial
purposes of the securities acts by relieving the SEC's enforcement burden and deterring
fraud. Id.; see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964) (burden on SEC is justification for implication under § 14(a)); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953) (§ 10(b)
assists in deterring fraud).
"1,[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,712, at 98,732.
192 Id. at 98,731 and 98,736-37.
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Circuit concluded that the well-established status of the implied private
right of action favored implication in the instant case.'93 The court indicated that if Congress did not intend to imply a private remedy under
section 10(b), Congress since would have limited or constricted judicial
application of implied remedies under that section.'94
Finding that Congress intended to create an implied right of action
under section 10(b), the D.C. Circuit next considered whether a private
right of action should be implied under section 10(b) when other sections
of the '33 and '34 Acts provide express remedies.'95 The court indicated
that remedies among the securities acts may freely overlap, 96 except
when implication would result in nullification of express remedies.'97 The
court examined the. express remedies of the '33 and '34 Acts, none of
which were available to the plaintiffs in Wachovia,"' and determined
that the remedies were totally different from the remedy implied under.
section 10(b). 1"9 The court noted that the remedies expressly provided by
sections 11 and 12 of the '33 Act are not inconsistent with an implied
right of action under section 10(b)."°9 The Wachovia court found that the
burden of proving scienter, rather than mere negligence, under section
10(b) counteracts the procedural restrictions of sections 11 and 12."'
Relying on Ross, the court also found that the plaintiff's burden of
establishing scienter under section 10(b) offsets the plaintiff's burden of
proving actual reliance under section 18. 21" Thus, the D.C. Circuit held
that implication does not nullify the express remedies of the '33 and '34
Acts, since defrauded investors are not substantially advantaged by proceeding under section 10(b) of the '34 Act.
Id at 98,731.

193

I& at 98,736-37.
",

See id. at 98,733-36.

I;d see SEC v. National Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969) (overlap between §§ 10(b)
and 14(a) of '34 Act does not limit either remedy). The Wachovia court distinguished Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), in which the Supreme Court expressed its extreme reluctance to imply a remedy when the statute already provided express remedies.
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,712, at 98,734 n.29; see text accompanying notes 132-34 supra.The D.C. Circuit noted that the Supreme Court expressly declined to
settle the "overlap" issue in Redington. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,712, at 98,734 n.29; see 442 U.S. at 574. The court further reasoned that, unlike
Redington, the legislative history in Wachovia did not indicate that the express remedies
were intended to be exclusive. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,712, at
98,734 n.29; see 442 U.S. at 573.
"'[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,712, at 98,734 (citing Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 208-11; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at

36).
[1980 Transfer Binder]
panying notes 178-79 supra.
[1980 Transfer Binder]
-I& at 98,734-35.
21

Id.

Id. at 98,735-36.

FED.

SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

97,712, at 98,736; see text accom-

FED.

SEC. L.

97,712, at 98,734.

REP.

(CCH)
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Unlike the Ross and Wachovia courts, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California recently adopted a "strict
construction" approach to implication in McFarlandv. Memorex. °3 Using
this approach, the court held that the existence of an express remedy
under section 11 or 12 of the '33 Act foreclosed implication of a section
10(b) private right of action for conduct covered by those sections." 4 In
McFarland, the plaintiff claimed that defendants"' comimitted fraud,
negligence, and other breaches of duty in connection with the offer and
sale of common stock of Memorex Corporation under a registration
statement and prospectus. 6 Plaintiff sought relief under various provisions of the securities acts, including sections 11 and 12 of the '33 Act
and section 10(b) of the '34 Act and rule 10b-5.1 7
After analyzing the sufficiency of the complaint, 8 the McFarland
court carefully examined the plaintiff's alleged private right of action.
The court's analysis represents a concerted effort to follow the recent
policy directives of the Supreme Court.0 9 The district court indicated
that congressional intent is the critical factor in determining whether to
imply a private right of action, rather than the consideration of whether
493 F. Supp. 631, 653-55 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
= Id. at 655.
= The defendant class in McFarlandincluded the Memorex Corporation, which issued
the stock, the underwriters, the officers and/or directors of Memorex at the time of the
stock offering, the certified public accountants who certified Memorex' annual Consolidated
Statements of Operation, and the persons and entities that sold warrants to purchase
Memorex stock to the underwriters prior to the offering. Id. at 634-35.
' Id. at 634. The McFarland plaintiff alleged that the defendants collectively were
responsible for false statements and omissions in the prospectus and registration statement
filed with the SEC. Id. at 635. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants
misrepresented the financial condition, net earnings, assets, and net worth of Memorex, attempted to conceal the company's materially poor operating results for the third quarter of
1978, and misrepresented that the financial statements in the prospectus and registration
statement fairly depicted Memorex' financial condition and operating results. Id. at 635-36.
Id. at 634. The McFarlandplaintiff alleged violations of §§ 11, 12, 15 and 17 of the '33
Act, as well as §§ 10(b), 18(a), and 20 of the '34 Act. Id.
"' The McFarland court held initially that the plaintiff's complaint lacked the requisite
particularity to state circumstances constituting fraud. Id. at 636; see FED. R. CIV. PRO. 9(b).
After dismissing the complaint, the court analyzed the alleged section violations to determine whether the defects in the complaint were curable. 493 F. Supp. at 640; see Barry v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 531 (1978)
(courts liberally allow plaintiff to replead after complaint dismissed under FED. R. Civ. PRO.
9(b)). The district court determined that only the Memorex directors and the non-director officers who signed the registration statement were subject to potential liability under § 11 of
the '33 Act. 493 F. Supp. at 642-47; see In re Gap Stores Secs. Litigation, 457 F. Supp. 1135,
1143 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (non-signing officers not liable under § 11); In re Equity Funding Corp.
of Am. Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (officers not liable under § 11
for aiding and abetting other wrongdoers); note 19 supra.The court also found that only the
underwriters were potentially liable under § 12 of the '33 Act. 493 F. Supp. at 643; see Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1979) (stock purchaser may bring § 12 action only against immediate seller); note 32 supra.
See text accompanying notes 124-30 supra.
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implication will further the remedial purposes of the securities acts.21
The court applied rules of strict construction and refused to imply a
remedy unless Congress intended that a remedy exist when it adopted a
particular provision."' The McFarlandcourt observed that when an express remedy potentially is available to the plaintiff, a court should
imply a private right of action under another section only if Congress
has declared an intent to afford multiple remedies for the same wrong."2
Applying this intent-oriented approach to the facts in McFarland,
the court found that Congress did not intend to create an implied
remedy under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 when express remedies are
available through provisions in the '33 Act." 3 The plaintiff in McFarland
had potential rights of action under sections 11 and 12(2) of the '33 Act. 1
The court found that implication of a private right of action under the
broad dictates of the '34 Act would imply a congressional intent to ignore the procedural restrictions carefully placed on express remedies in
the '33 Act. 1 ' The court refused to impute such intentional cancellation
to the actions of the Congress in enacting the '34 Act. 216 Instead, the
McFarland court in effect found that the burden of provin,; congressional intent to provide for multiple remedies had shifted to the plaintiff
upon the finding that express remedies were available.1 7 Finding no express congressional intent to provide for multiple remedies, the court
refused to imply a private right of action under section 10(b).218
The Ross, Wachovia, and McFarland approaches to implying a
private right under section 10(b) are inadequate. The lower court ap2,0

493 F. Supp. at 640-41; see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)

(ultimate question is congressional intent, rather than whether court thinks it can improve
upon statutory scheme).
211
112

493 F. Supp. at 640.
Id. at 655.

213 Id. The McFarland court viewed the widespread acceptance of the § 10(b) implied
remedy as a consequence of history, rather than an indication that Congress had intended to
create a remedy under that section. Id. at 654-55; see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 577 n.19 (1979) (Supreme Court recognition of § 10(b) implied remedy was mere acquiesence in 25-year acceptance by lower courts); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
667, 690-93 n.13 (1979) (same).
214 See note 208 supra.
210

493 F. Supp. at 655.

216

Id

See id.
Id. at 655. Because of prior Ninth Circuit decisions, the McFarlandcourt declined to
prevent a § 10(b) cause of action at such an early stage of the litigation. Id.; see Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961) (implying § 10(b) remedy when express remedies
available). If the plaintiff is successful in alleging fraud, see note 208 supra, however, the
McFarland court's rhetoric indicates that the court will not hesitate to deny an implied
right of action under § 10(b). 493 F. Supp. at 655.
In addition to questioning the implication of a private right of action under § 10(b), the
McFarlandcourt refused to recognize an implied right of action under § 17(a) of the '33 Act.
Id. at 650. The court reasoned from Redington and Transamericathat the Supreme Court
did not favor inferring any new private rights of action under the securities laws. Id.
211
218
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proaches either fail to apply or misapply the two-part test adopted by
the Supreme Court in Redington and Transamerica for ascertaining
whether to imply a private right of action.
The Second Circuit's "nullification" approach in Ross focuses
primarily on whether the terms of the implied remedy unjustifiably
would abrogate the procedural and substantive limitations of the competing express remedy.210 The "nullification" approach is similar to the
Supreme Court's examination of whether implication would be consistent with the Act's overall legislative scheme in ascertaining whether
Congress intended to create a private remedy.220 By focusing solely on
this factor, however, the Ross court fails to consider two other important indicators of legislative intent, which are the plaintiff's status as an
intended beneficiary of the statute and the statute's legislative
history."1 In addition, the Second Circuit's application of its "nullification" approach is flawed. As a concept, "nullification" of a statute occurs
when the statute is rendered absolutely void.222 Because the distinction
between voidness and non-voidness may be narrow, a proper "nullification" approach requires a careful section-by-section consideration of the
effect of an implied remedy on an express liability provision.2" In Ross,
however, the court failed to consider the severe procedural restrictions
placed on the express remedies in examining whether an implied remedy
would nullify the express provisions.'
The Ross approach, along with Wachovia's "legislative intent" approach, is also incorrect in the degree of veneration it accords to the
widespread acceptance of an implied right of action under section 10(b). 2 5
Both Ross and Wachovia focus on the present intent of Congress, with
the Ross court reasoning that the continued acceptance of a section 10(b)
remedy indicates congressional approval.220 The D.C. Circuit goes even
further in Wachovia, reasoning from Congress' failure to limit or constrict the remedy that Congress must have initially intended to create
the private remedy.7 The concern of both courts with the intent of the
current Congress is misguided and irrelevant. In interpreting statutes,
,l See text accompanying notes 151-52 supra.
m See text accompanying note 128 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
2
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 963 (5th ed. 1979); see Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A
Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of the FederalSecuritiesLaws,
28 HASTINGs L.J. 569, 607 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Cox] (one or more isolated advantages
in § 10(b) action will not nullify express remedies).
See text accompanying notes 243-85 infra.
See 607 F.2d at 556.
The Ross and Wachovia courts failed to acknowledge the Supreme Court's statement in Cannon that the recognition of an implied remedy under § 10(b) was "mere acquiescence." Cannon v. University v. Chicago, 441 U.S. at 692 n.13.
See 607 F.2d at 556; text accompanying note 165 supra.
See [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,712, at 98,731 and 98,736-37;
text accompanying notes 192-94 supra.
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courts should seek to give effect to the legislature's intent at the time of
the statute's enactment.22 The inaction of a subsequent Congress forms
a particularly hazardous basis for determining the intent of the enacting
Congress." 9
The Supreme Court's decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc.?0 further indicates that widespread recognition of a section 10(b)
remedy does not necessarily mean that courts should uniformly imply a
right of action under that section. In Piper, the Court held that courts
may imply a private right of action under section 14(e) of the '34 Act in
favor of tendering shareholders but not in favor of a defeated tender offeror. 11 The selective delineation of a private remedy in Piperindicates
that recognition of an implied remedy may depend upon the status of the
plaintiff.232 Since the Supreme Court has sanctioned selective implication
of private rights of action, lower courts should use the Court's analytical
framework to determine whether particular classes of plaintiffs have
standing to invoke the section 10(b) remedy.
In attempting to apply the Supreme Court's methodology for ascertaining the intent of the enacting Congress, the Wachovia court commits
several grievous errors. By finding that the plaintiffs, as investors, are
members of the special class for which Congress enacted the statute, the
D.C. Circuit failed to consider the Supreme Court's reluctance to imply
rights of action under statutes that create general duties for the benefit
of the public. 23 3 The court also erred in searching for a congressional intent to deny a private remedy after failing to find an express congressional intent to create the private right.3 4 The Supreme Court indicated
in Transamericathat if a court can find no express congressional intent
to create a private remedy in the legislative history, the court should
look for implicit congressional intent in the statute's language, structure, or the circumstances of the statute's enactment. 5 If these sources
fail to reveal a congressional intent to imply a private right of action, a
court should deny the requested private remedy.3 6 Finally, in recognizI Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 560 n.16; see 2A SUTHERLAND, supra
note 91, at § 45.05. The intent of the current Congress is important only to the extent that
Congress may enact an express right of action if it finds judicial denial of an implied remedy
unacceptable. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 579.
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1960).
430 U.S. 1 (1977).
' Id at 37-41.
See 1978-1979 Securities Law Developments: PrivateRights of Action, 36 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 944, 947-48 (1979).
See text accompanying notes 102-04 supra. The Supreme Court views § 10(b) as
creating duties for the benefit of the public at large. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. at 692 n.13.
See text accompanying notes 187-88 supra.
Transamercia Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 18; see text accompanying note 119 supra.
444 U.S. at 18.
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ing that remedies in the securities act may freely overlap," 7 the
Wachovia court ignored the Supreme Court's expressed reluctance to
imply a private right of action when an express remedy is or was potentially available. 8
By employing a radically different methodology and refusing to
imply a private right of action under section 10(b), the McFarland court's
"strict construction" approach is subject to different criticisms than the
approaches in Ross and Wachovia. Unlike other lower courts," 9 the
district court in McFarland has over-reacted in its response to
24
Redington and Transamerica.
By requiring the plaintiff to prove that
Congress clearly intended to provide for multiple remedies,24' the
McFarland court established an unnecessarily heavy burden against implication. Many statutes, including section 10(b), have little direct
legislative history.242 Congress seldom will have possessed the foresight
to express an intent to provide for cumulative remedies in this scant
legislative history.
A careful application of the Supreme Court's methodology for implying a private right of action to section 10(b) is perhaps the best indicator
2 43
of the inadequacy of the Ross, Wachovia, and McFarland approaches.
See text accompanying note 196 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
"= Lower federal courts have continued to recognize an implied private cause of action
under § 10(b) in the period since the Redington and Transamericadecisions. E.g., Martin v.
Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedricks, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 503, 506 (E.D. La. 1980); In re New
York City Mun. Sec. Litigation, 87 F.R.D. 572, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The Second Circuit recently followed the traditional Cort test in implying a private remedy under the Commodity
Exchange Act. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
1346 (1981) (recent Supreme Court decisions simply "emphasize that the ultimate
touchstone is congressional intent").
240 The McFarlandcourt's preoccupation with following the conservative attitude of the
Supreme Court overlooks the fact that in several recent decisions the Court has broadly
construed certain sections of the federal securities laws. In these cases, the Court emphasized that congressional intent mandated the broad constructions. See, e.g., Rubin v. United
States, 101 S. Ct. 698, 701 (1981) (pledge of securities is "sale" under § 17(a) of '34 Act);
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-96 (1980) (negligence standard under § 17(a)(1) of '33 Act);
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 771-79 (1979) (§ 17(a)(1) of '33 Act prohibits fraud
against brokers).
2, See text accompanying note 212 supra.
242 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 202 (Congress spent little time discussing § 10(b));.BROMBERG &LOWENFELS, supra note 4, at 7.2 (331) (references to § 10(b) in House
of Representatives scarcely would fill a page).
243 The formulation of the "correct" approach for determining whether to imply a §
10(b) right of action is of immediate significance. Ross was the first lower court decision in
the post-Redington/Transamericaera to consider implication of a private right of action
under § 10(b) when the defendant's conduct was actionable under an express remedy. Commentators generally have criticized the Ross decision. E.g., Higgins, supra note 60, at
781-83; Note, Rule 10b-5: The Circuits Debate the Exclusivity of Remedies, the PurchaserSeller Requirement and Constructive Deception,37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 877-88 (1980).
But see Hazen, CorporateMismanagementand the Federal SecuritiesAct's Antifraud Provisons: A FamiliarPath with Some New Detours, 20 B.C. L. REV. 819, 857-58 (1979). The
'
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The Court's legislative intent test militates against implication of a section 10(b) cause of action in cases involving conduct proscribed by any of
the express remedies of the '33 or '34 Act. Section 10(b) does not
create a distinct federal right in a class of plaintiffs.144 The legislative
history of section 10(b) further indicates that Congress did not intend
that an implied remedy under section 10(b) extend to conduct proscribed
by express remedies.245 Congress enacted section 10(b) for the express
purpose of providing the SEC with the authority to enjoin manipulative
24
and deceptive conduct not otherwise prohibited by the '33 or '34 Act. 1
Consequently, the legislative history of the '34 Act suggests that the
conduct proscribed in the express liability provisions of the securities
247
acts is beyond the reach of section 10(b).
The final consideration in the legislative intent analysis is whether
implication of a private remedy is consistent with the overall legislative
scheme of the statute. 48 The Supreme Court has indicated that an implied remedy which is significantly broader than an applicable express
remedy is inconsistent with the legislative scheme of the '34 Act. 24 A

proper analysis of the implication question therefore requires a comparison between the implied section 10(b) remedy and the express liability sections. Courts should discourage implication when the implied
remedy is more attractive than the available express remedy, rather
than requiring that the implied remedy absolutely nullify the express
remedy.
In comparing the section 10(b) remedy to the express liability provisions, courts should be particularly sensitive to the deterrent values of
three elements: the plaintiff's burden of proving scienter under section
10(b), and the restrictive limitations period and bonding requirements of
the express remedies. Courts frequently have overestimated the difficulty of showing scienter under section 10(b) and underestimated the express remedies' limitations.
The plaintiff's burden of alleging scienter does not significantly
restrict the potential use of section 10(b).250 Some courts allow plaintiffs
Sixth Circuit has, however, recognized the Ross "nullification" approach. See Adams v.
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 429 n.6 (6th Cir. 1980) (dicta). Following Ross and
Wachovia, the Fifth Circuit has most recently held that a cause of action exists under § 10(b)
even when the deceit on which it is based is actionable under the express remedy provisions
of the securities laws. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981.
24 Investors are clearly one of the prime beneficiaries of § 10(b). S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934); see text accompanying note 164 supra.Because of the large size of the investor class, however, § 10(b) effectively creates duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the public at large. See note
233 supra.
24. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
28 See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
247See Ruder, supra note 70, at 659.
28 See text accompanying note 128 supra.
29 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442

U.S. at 573-74.
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1251 (D. Del. 1978); Pearlstein v. Justice
Mortgage Advisers, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,760, at 94,977 (N.D.
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limited discovery in order to develop more fully their scienter allegations."' All courts liberally grant leave to replead, 52 thus allowing plaintiffs to gather additional facts through informal or state law means.21 3 In
addition, courts merely require an allegation of "some element of
scienter,"' 4 which a plaintiff may satisfy by showing reckless conduct by
the defendant.5s Under this standard, the scienter requirement is no
more difficult to satisfy than the good faith defenses available in several
express remedies." 6 Finally, a plaintiff may find that scienter is not invariably more difficult to prove than negligence. 7
In comparing the desirability of the section 10(b) remedy to an express remedy, courts often overlook the advantages inherent in the section 10(b) limitations period. Congress' failure to supply an express
statute of limitations provision for section 10(b) affords a plaintiff
several distinct advantages. The adoption of a state limitations period
generally gives the section 10(b) plaintiff more time to discover a violation and bring an action."' The federal tolling doctrine may further extend the section 10(b) filing period. 9 Finally, because section 10(b) does
not contain a statute of limitations provision, a plaintiff proceeding
under that section will not have to plead and prove compliance with the
statute of limitations.2"' Given the determinative nature of a limitations
period,' a plaintiff may find the foregoing advantages important in
electing to pursue a section 10(b) claim when the defendant's conduct
might have been actionable under an express remedy. 62
Tex. 1978); Patrick, The Impact of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: Pleading with Particularity, 8 INST. SEC. REG. 380, 383 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pleading with Particularity];Express Remedy, supra note 43, at 856-57.
22 Bishop v. Sklar, Civ. No. 75-H-618-5 (N.D. Ala. 1975). Contra, Segan v. Dreyfus
Corp., 513 F.2d 695, 696 (2d Cir. 1975).
25

See generally 2A

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

9.03, at 9-25, -39 (3d rev. ed. 1979).

See Pleading with Particularity,supra note 250, at 384.
' Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
See note 73 supra.
See text accompanying notes 280-82 infra.
See Note, Prospectus Liability and Rule 10b-5: A Sequel to Barchris, 1971 DUKE
L.J. 559, 564 n.20 (citing ease of proving scienter, and difficulty of proving negligence, when
defendant went through motion of exercising due care in making statement but did so with
foreknowledge that statement would be misleading).
I See 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS supra note 4, § 2.5(1); 5 JACOBS, supra note 30, §
235-03; note 78 supra.
11 See note 78 supra. The federal tolling doctrine cannot extend the three-year period
of limitations for the express remedies of the '33 and '34 Acts. Turner v. First Wis. Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 911 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
' Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 525-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
While the § 10(b) plaintiff must prove that his conduct satisfies the federal tolling doctrine,
many courts do not require him to assert his due diligence or to set forth the time of
discovery of the fraud in his complaint. Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses to Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 Actions, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 879 (1976).
" Statutes of limitations may thwart liability under a statute, rather than merely making an action under the statute less desirable. See JACOBS, supra note 30, § 234.
1 Because of § 10(b)'s adoption of state statutes of limitations and the section's broad
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A plaintiff may also choose to proceed under section 10(b) to avoid
the potential imposition of security for costs and attorneys' fees under
the express remedies.26 Statutes imposing security for expenses are insurmountable for many plaintiffs.264 Because the courts' power to impose
costs under an express remedy is discretionary, a plaintiff proceeding
under one of those sections has no assurance that his good faith conduct
will protect him.26 If a court imposes security for costs, the plaintiff has
no right to appeal the court's decision.26
In addition to the restrictive statute of limitations and cost assessment provisions, other elements and defenses of sections 11 and 12 of the
'33 Act discourage plaintiffs from bringing actions under those
sections.26 Congress specifically limited the right to bring an action to
purchasers under section 11 and to those persons having claims against
their immediate sellers in section 12.266 A potential plaintiff falling within
one of these narrow classifications may further hesitate before proceeding, because of the rejuvenated status of the "due diligence" and
"reasonable care" defenses of sections 11 and 12(2).269
Finally, potential plaintiffs may decline to bring an action under sections 11 and 12 because of these sections' limitations on damage awards.
The circumscribed damages available under sections 11 and 12 reflect
Congress' primary intent that the sections deter illicit conduct, rather
than compensate harmed investors.2 1 The damage-limiting causation
provision of section 11 further restricts the usefulness of that remedy in
time periods involving a decline in the market price of all stocksY1 In
contrast to the section 11 and 12 remedies, the implied nature of a section 10(b) action accounts for great judicial flexibility in assessing

broad venue provisions, see note 79 supra, § 10(b) actions also may foster forum shopping.
Higgins, supra note 59, at 784; cf Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 1127, 1139-40 (1979) (state borrowing statutes may limit forum shopping under §
10(b)).
See notes 26, 51, and 80 supra.
1 BROMBERO & LOWENFELS, supra note 4, § 2.5(e). Congress enacted the provisions
regarding security costs for the purpose of deterring suits. See note 26 supra.
' 3 Loss, supra note 8, at 1841.
' Klein v. Adams & Peck, 436 F.2d 337, 338-39 (2d Cir. 1971). A district court's imposition of costs is not appealable because it is not a final order and seldom could constitute an
abuse of discretion. Id.
11 Despite the disadvantages of §§ 11 and 12, Congress' imposition of the burden of
proof on the defendant in actions under those sections would appear to make the sections
more attractive to a plaintiff than § 10(b). See notes 16 and 31 supra. Courts have tempered
this advantage, however, by refusing to grant motions to dismiss under § 10(b) prior to
discovery. E.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974); see Cox, supra note
222, at 603-04.
' See text accompanying notes 19 and 32 supra.
2" See text accompanying notes 21 and 35 supra.
27' See text accompanying note 11 supra.
" See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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damage awards. 2 Decisions granting plaintiffs compensation under section 10(b) in the amount by which their actual damages exceed- their
recovery under the '33 Act emphasize the expansive potential of a sec27 3
tion 10(b) remedy.
The remedies available under sections 9(e) and 18 4 of the '34 Act
also are significantly narrower than the implied section 10(b) remedy. 5
Section 18 requires a plaintiff to establish reliance on the actual report
which contains the misstatement or omission." Because of this stringent
reliance requirement, only the diligent few who read corporate reports
can assert a claim under section 18.17 In addition, section 9(e)'s willfulness
requirement 8 and section 18's "good faith" defense1 9 are the practical
equivalents of a scienter requirement. The section 9(e) plaintiff's burden
of proving the defendant's willful manipulation appears to equal the
Court's liberal section 10(b) requirement of proof of "some element of
scienter."' 8 Although the defendant has the burden of proving his good
faith under section 18, courts and commentators have equated this "good
"
faith" defense with the scienter requirement of section 10(b).28
' Both sections 9(e) and 18 appear to preclude liability for recklessness, which most
courts have found sufficient for liability under section 10(b)."' In addition
272 See note 77 supra.

E.g., Foster v. Financial Tech. Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975); Beecher v.
Able, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,303, at 98,534 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); see Measure of Damages, supra note 77, at 1165.
"' Courts and commentators recently have recognized the limited scope of the § 18
remedy and concluded that the remedy precludes an implied cause of action under § 10(b).
E.g., McKee v. Federal's Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,958, at
96,023 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,760, at 94,974-76 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Berman v. Richford Indus.,
Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,518, at 94,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Kulchok v. Government Employees Ins. Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,002, at 91,512 (D.D.C. 1977). See generally Higgins, supra note 59; Toothless
Tiger, supra note 60; Express Remedy, supra note 43.
" See text accompanying notes 276-85. In contrast to the other express remedies of
the '34 Act, § 16(b) may actually be more advantageous to a plaintiff than § 10(b). The section contains no scienter-like defense or procedural requirement other than a two-year
statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Section 16(b) does, however, limit the plaintiff class to those suing on behalf of the issuer. Id.; see text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
See generally JACOBS, supra note 30, § 3.02[g].
8

See note 61 supra.

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745 (1975); Toothless Tiger,
supra note 60, at 116. Most investors never see, much less read, corporate reports. See
Cohen, supra note 43, at 1359-60.
m7See text accompanying note 46 supra.
See text accompanying note 63 supra.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201; note 73 supra.
=' E.g., Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP (CCH) 96,760, at 94,975 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 211 n.31).
' Higgins, supra note 59, at 787; see note 73 supra.
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to restrictive limitations periods, 3 bonding requirements, 4 and limited
damage awards similar to those under the '33 Act,285 the foregoing
elements have discouraged plaintiffs from proceeding under sections 9(e)
and 18 of the '34 Act.
Thus, a private action under section 10(b) is significantly more attractive to potential plaintiffs than the express remedies of the '33 and
'34 Acts.288 Application of the Supreme Court's legislative intent analysis
indicates that Congress intended the express remedies to be exclusive.
In addition to the restrictiveness of the express remedies, the care by
which Congress developed the express liability provisions evidences its
desire that the remedies be exclusive. The express remedies of the '33
and '34 Acts reflect the meticulous drafting, compromises, and amendments of a Congress expressly concerned with the potentially volatile effects of its actions on the securities industry. Recognizing this manifest
legislative intent, the proper judicial approach must refuse implication
of a private right of action under section 10(b) whenever the defendant's
conduct violates an express liability provision. Only through the use of
such an approach may a court accommodate both the intent of the enacting Congress and the established judicial recognition that a private right
of action may lie under section 10(b).
DANA S. CONNELL

See text accompanying notes 49 and 65 supra.
See text accompanying notes 50 and 66 supra.
21
See text accompanying notes 48 and 64 supra.
The implied § 10(b) remedy has produced significantly more litigation than the
express liability provisions. See, e.g., SEC v. National Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) §
10(b) may be most litigated provision in federal securities law); 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS,
supra note 4, § 2.4(1)(a) (§ 10(b) generates several times as much litigation as express
remedies); Causation of Damages, supra note 23, at 227 (only 11 reported recoveries under §
11 between 1933 and 1976).
2

